An Asian Nuclear Cooperation Regime :: Politics Political Science ASIATOM

An Asian Nuclear Cooperation Regime I. Introduction Nuclear cooperation regimes have long been considered as confidence-building measures designed to reduce tensions arising from the uncertainty of nations’ nuclear energy programs. The first such regime was EURATOM, which emerged in Europe as a separate system of safeguards and transparency measures for European states. This regime was consistent with the goal of the political unification of the European Economic Community, and might not have functioned as effectively had it not been tied to that political effort. Currently a discussion of an Asian nuclear cooperation regime is underway, initiated by Japanese officials and intellectuals, which may borrow substantially from the European experience in nuclear cooperation. These officials have proposed the creation of an ASIATOM, which would include Japan, China, North Korea, South Korea, and possibly Taiwan. Others have expanded the regime’s potential membership to the U.S., Canada, and Australia, and labeled the potential group PACATOM. There have been several proposals for such a nuclear cooperation regime, and they vary according to the activities encompassed and the degree of cooperation involved. The central point of controversy over ASIATOM proposals has been the issue of reprocessing. Japan has currently invested substantial amounts of its resources into the development of civil reprocessing capability, and China may be prepared to do the same. The United States would be unlikely to violate its Carter Administration policy of discouraging reprocessing outside the U.S., and would be unlikely to support or join an ASIATOM that involved reprocessing. One anonymous U.S. State Department official stated, "’Clearly, if an Asiatom proposal is about reprocessing, it’s not going to fly†¦And if it excludes the U.S., it’s not going to fly,’ the official said, adding: ‘Japan does not want to go it alone.’"1 The reprocessing issue is also the central reason for the general support for the idea of an ASIATOM in Japan. Japan’s civilian reprocessing proposals, with plans to move to fast-breeder reactors, has made some states in the Asia- Pacific region wary of their intentions. After all, reprocessing of spent fuel involves the separation of plutonium, and even reactor-grade plutonium (involving greater concentrations of Pu-240 and Pu-242) is suitable for weapons production in sufficient quantities. Japan’s reprocessing program has caused other states in the region to begin to raise the issue of developing their own reprocessing capabilities. From the U.S. perspective, the spread of reprocessing capability is damaging to regional security interests because of the possibility of the use of reprocessing for either deliberate national-level nuclear weapons production or the possibility of the theft of separated fissile material.